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NOTES
is the proper forum for reconciling divergent findings. The proper ap-
proach for the appellate courts to follow is a uniform application of the
manifest error doctrine.
Steven A. Glaviano
LOUISIANA'S USEFUL CLASS ACTION: WILLIAMS V. STATE
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his
strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next step is
either to kill, or to tame him and make him a useful animal *
Five inmates of the state penitentiary attempted to bring a class ac-
tion on behalf of the approximately six hundred prisoners who had suf-
fered severe attacks of food poisoning. Negligent and unsanitary
preparation of the prison meal was the alleged cause of the contamina-
tion. Class certification was denied by the district court because of the
possible variance in damages to individual class members. The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court held that the class action remedy was available to
victims of this mass tort, even though there was a possibility of variance
in the individual damages. To satisfy due process requirements, how-
ever, the court utilized its inherent power to order notice to individual
class members in the absence of a statutory provision. Williams v. State,
350 So. 2d 131 (La. 1977).
Although unknown in civil law countries, ' the class action has been
adopted by statute in Louisiana. 2 The redactors of the Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure based the class action provisions upon Federal Rule
23, as it was written at that time. 3 Finding Louisiana's liberal joinder
* Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
1. Hamburger, State Class Actions and The Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 610
n.6 (1971). The class action is an invention of equity which allows a group of claimants
with a similar interest in a particular matter to sue through one or more representatives
without having to join each member of the class on a suit. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32, 41 (1940); C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 72 at 345 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as WRIGHT]; Comment, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Litigation ofAir Crashes,
29 RUTGERS L. REV. 425, 427 (1976); Comment, Federal and State ClassActions. Develop-
ments and Opportunities, 46 Miss. L.J. 39, 40 (1975).
2. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 591-597.
3. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 591, comment (b). As enacted in 1937, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 provided in part:
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rules to be sufficient, 4 the redactors omitted the non-conclusive "hybrid"
and "spurious" class actions5 and only provided for "true" class actions
which bind all members of the class.6 Under the scheme of the Code,
three elements must exist for a class action to be brought: a class so nu-
merous that joinder is impracticable;7 the presence of one or more class
members who will represent the class adequately; 8 and a right asserted
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make
it impracticable to bring them all before the Court;... one or more, as will
fairly insure the adequate representation of all may.., sue when the char-
acter of the relief sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint or common... ;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which
do or may affect specific property... ;
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact .
The three different sections of Rule 23 were labeled "true," "hybrid," and "spurious."
Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure., Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft,
25 GEo. L. J. 551, 572-76 (1937). The various sections proved to be confusing and unwork-
able. See, e.g., 3B J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23.01 [8], at 23-19 (2d ed.
1969); 7 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1752
(1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]; WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 72 at 345;
Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684
(1941); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee.- 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 380 (1967); Simeone, Procedure Problems
of Class Suits, 60 MICH. L. REV. 905 (1962); Weinstein, Revision of Procedure- Some
Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 433 (1960).
4. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 591, comment (d).
5. The spurious class action had been called a "permissive joinder device" since it only
bound the members of the class who had joined in the action. Absentees, in effect, had to
"opt in" the suit to avail themselves of the class judgment. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 3, § 1752 at n.85; Comment, Making the Class Determination in Rule 23 (b) (3) Class
Actions, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 792 (1974); Comment, State Class Action Statutes. A
Comparative Analysis, 60 IOWA L. REV. 93, 107 (1974).
6. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 591, comment (c); Williams v. State, 350 So. 2d 131, 133
(La. 1977); Stevens v. Bd. of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 309 So. 2d 144, 149 (La.
1975).
7. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 591. See, e.g., Caswell v. Reserve Nat'l. Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d
250, 256 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 364, 236 So. 2d 499 (1970) ("persons in
the class ... are so numerous that joinder is impracticable, if not impossible"); Verdin v.
Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966) ("must only be shown to be impracticable
to join all of the persons involved; the plaintiff need not allege or prove that the joinder of
all parties is impossible"); Comment, New Dimension in Louisiana Class Actions, 36 LA. L.
REV. 798, 800 (1976).
8. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 592. Because the named representative asserts the interest of
all absent class members, due process requirements become involved in his selection. See,
e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Roussel v. Noe, 274 So. 2d 205, 209 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1973). See also Kane, Standing, Mootness, and Federal Rule 23-Balancing
Perspectives, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 83 (1977); Maraist & Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled
Marriage-Due Process and the Class Action, 49 TEX. L. REV. 1, 22 (1970); Comment,
supra note 7, at 802-07.
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that is "common to all members of the class."9 The Code further pro-
vides that litigation expenses, including attorney fees, may be awarded
by the court if there is a recovery beneficial to the class.10 Finally, in
accord with the "true" class action concept, the Code expressly states
that "a definitive judgment on the merits rendered in a class action con-
cludes all members of the class, whether joined in the action or not
In applying the class action provisions of article 591, Louisiana
courts experienced difficulty in determining when a right was "common
to all members of the class."' 12 A conflict soon developed among the
circuits.13 The requirement of article 591(1) was interpreted by the Sec-
ond and Fourth Circuits to mean that the "common right" asserted must
be of such a nature that all members of the class would have been neces-
sary, if not indispensable, parties were it not for the size of the class. 14
The First Circuit, on the other hand, applied a more liberal "community
of interest" test 15 similar to the requirement for permissive joinder under
article 463 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 16
In the landmark decision of Stevens v. Board of Trustees of the Police
Pension Fund,17 the supreme court adopted the federal class action crite-
9. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 591(1). See Comment, supra note 7, at 807-11. See also
text accompanying notes 19-25, infra.
10. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 595.
11. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 597.
12. See, e.g., Stevens v. Bd. of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 295 So. 2d 36 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 309 So. 2d 144 (La. 1975); Bussie v. Long, 286 So. 2d 689 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 288 So. 2d 354 (La. 1974); Caswell v. Reserve Nat'l. Ins.
Co., 234 So. 2d 250 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 364, 236 So. 2d 499 (1970).
13. Compare Verdin v. Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966) with Caswell
v. Reserve Nat'l. Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d 250 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 364, 236
So. 2d 499 (1970). See also Comment, supra note 7, at 808; Note, 50 TUL. L. REV. 692
(1976).
14. See, e.g., Stevens v. Bd. of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 295 So. 2d 36 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 309 So. 2d 144 (La. 1975); Veal v. Preferred Thrift & Loan, 234
So. 2d 228 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
15. See, e.g., Latino v. City of Bogalousa, 295 So. 2d 560 (La. App. ist Cir. 1974);
Bussie v. Long, 286 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973),,cert. denied, 288 So. 2d 354 (La.
1974); White v. Bd. of Trustees of Teachers Retirement Syst., 276 So. 2d 714 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 279 So. 2d 694 (La. 1973).
16. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 463 provides in part: "Two or more parties may be joined in
the same suit . . . if: (1) There is a community of interest between the parties joined
. .. For a definition of "community of interest" see Gill v. City of Lake Charles, 119
La. 17, 43 So. 897 (1907).
17. 309 So. 2d 144 (La. 1975), discussed in The Work ofthe Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1974-1975 Term--Civil Procedure, 36 LA. L. REv. 562, 563 (1975); Comment, supra
note 7; Note, 50 TUL. L. REv. 692 (1976).
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ria to determine the existence of a "common right" as required by the
Louisiana statute. In Stevens, a former Shreveport policeman instituted
a class action on his own behalf and on behalf of other former officers
who were denied refunds of their compulsory contributions to the police
pension fund. Writing for the supreme court, Justice Tate found the
Second Circuit's test for determining what constituted a "common right"
to be too restrictive.' 8 At the same time, he rejected the "community of
interest" test of the First Circuit as being too permissive.19 Instead, dis-
cretionary criteria were adopted based upon the provisions of Federal
Rule 23 as amended20 and the policy goals behind the class action de-
vice. 2 1 Since Rule 23 only provides for a "true" class action which binds
all members of the class, 22 Justice Tate stated that the guidelines estab-
lished therein are indicative of the "occasions for maintaining a class
action under our own code articles."' 23 In establishing these pragmatic
criteria, the court implemented the goals behind the class action proce-
dure-an efficient operation of the judicial system, promotion of maxi-
mum fairness for the parties, and implementation of the substantive law
of the cause of action.24
By the court's action in Stevens, the federal jurisprudence and com-
mentary gained added significance for Louisiana class actions.25 In fed-
18. 309 So. 2d at 147.
19. Id
20. In 1966, FED. R. Civ. P. 23 was amended to provide functional terms in place of
the abstract criteria of the original rule. See, e.g., Ford, Federal Rule 23. 4 Devicefor
Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B. C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 501, 504 (1969); Note, 9 GA. L.
REv. 893, 898 (1975). The major change initiated by the amendment of Rule 23 was that it
provided for only a "true" class action by requiring the judgment in all class actions to be
binding on all class members. Accord, WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 72 at 350.
21. 309 So. 2d at 151.
22. See note 20, supra.
23. 309 So. 2d at 150. The pragmatic terms of Rule 23(b) which the court used to
determine the availability of class actions are:
(1) Whether a class action is necessary to avoid possible adverse effects on the
opponents of the class or on absent members of the class;
(2) Whether a party opposing the class action has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class;
(3) If there is a question of law or fact common to the members of the class,
(a) Whether the common question predominates over any question affect-
ing only individual members;
(b) Whether the class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
24. 309 So. 2d at 151.
25. See Comment, supra note 7, at 810; Note, 50 TUL. L. REV. 692, 698 (1976). The
Louisiana Supreme Court has taken an approach similar to that used by the California
courts, which have, through a liberalized interpretation of an abstract and general class
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eral mass tort class actions, the advisory committee for proposed Rule 23
set the general standard by stating that "a mass accident resulting in in-
juries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action
.... "26 Most federal courts, with a few notable exceptions, 27 have fol-
lowed the rule established by the advisory committee. 28 The leading
case allowing a class action in a mass tort situation is American Trading
& Production Corp. v. Fischback & Moore, Inc. 29 in which 1,200 exhibi-
tions were damaged by a fire in an exhibition hall. The court allowed a
class action, stating that all of the requirements of Rule 23 were met and
that "the only issue distinguishing the class members was the amount of
damages sustained."' 30 The court held that a possible variance in dam-
ages did not defeat the action once the criteria for a class action are
met.3 ' A similar result was reached in Bentkowski v. Marfuerza Compa-
nia Maritima32 in which victims of food and water poisoning on a cruise
ship sought damages. The court held that "a collective prosecution was
preferable to individual suits" since all of the criteria for Federal Rule 23
action statute, made California class action adjudication mirror the approach of the federal
practice. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 94
Cal. Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964 (1971); Comment, Determining Class Maintainability in
Calfornia, 27 HASTINGs L. J. 293 (1975).
26. Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Rule of Civil Procedure 23, 39 F.R.D. 69,
103 (1966). See also Kaplan, supra note 3, at 393; Weinstein, supra note 3, at 469 (al-
lowing a class action in a mass tort would create a kind of "legalized ambulance chasing").
But, most commentators have stated that under some circumstances the class action rem-
edy should be available in mass tort situations. See, e.g., 3B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE, 23.45 [3], at 23-347 n.31 (2d ed. 1969); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3,
§ 1783 at 117 (1972); Comment, The Use of Class Actionsfor Mass Accident Litigation, 23
Lov. L. REV. 383, 405 (1977); Comment, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Litigation of
Mass Air Crashes, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 425, 452 (1976); Comment, Mass Accident Class
Actions, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1615, 1633 (1972); Comment, Damages in Class Actions." Determi-
nation andA1ocation, 10 B. C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 615, 618 (1969).
27. See, e.g., Bentkowski v. Marfuerza Compania Maritima, 70 F.R.D. 401 (E.D. Pa.
1976); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 58 (S.D. Fla. 1973); a fdmem., 507
F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975); Petition of Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
28. See, e.g., Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
911 (1976); Marchesi v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Causey v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Va. 1975); Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344
F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aft'd on other grounds, 483 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 946 (1974); Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa.
1970).
29. 47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
30. Id at 157.
31. Id
32. 70 F.R.D. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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were met and only minor injury was sustained.33 Thus while the use of
class actions in mass torts is the exception, the federal courts have shown
a tendency to allow the device to be used when the class action is supe-
rior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy. 34
The general availability of federal class actions has been severely
limited by several recent United States Supreme Court decisions.35 In
Snyder v. Harris36 the Supreme Court established the rule that separate
claims of the class could not be aggregated to reach the required j urisdic-
tional amount. This rule was extended in Zahn v. International Paper
Company37 where it was held that the individual claim of each named
and unnamed party must satisfy the jurisdictional amount. A further
restricting element on the availability of federal class actions was added
in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,38 where the Court required that individ-
ual notice be given to all identifiable class members with the costs borne
by the named representative. Due to these limitations imposed on fed-
eral class actions by the Supreme Court, more attention is being placed
on the state courts as possible forums in which the class action may be
advanced.39
33. Id at 404. If the injury to the individual class members is large, the class action
remedy will not be appropriate since there will be a greater need for each individual to
control the litigation of his lawsuit.
34. Federal courts now seem to be in agreement that a mass tort class action will not be
allowed unless the action is brought under Rule 23(b) (3) and not 23(b) (1) or (2). See, e.g.,
Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 767 (9th Cir. 1977); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911
(1976); Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 397 (E.D. Va. 1975); Com-
ment, The Use of Class Actionsfor Mass Accident Litigation, 23 Loy. L. REV. 383, 404
(1977); Comment, MassAccident ClassActions, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1615, 1620-27 (1972). But
see Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 560 (S.D. Fla. 1973), afdmem.,
507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975).
35. See Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
36. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
37. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). See generally Theis, Zahn v. International Paper Co..: The
Non-Aggregation Rule in Jurisdictional Amount Cases, 35 LA. L. REV. 89 (1974).
38. 417 U.S. 156 (1974), discussed in Comment, Federal and State Class Actions: Devel-
opments and Opportunities, 46 Miss. L.J. 39 (1975).
39. See, e.g., Scher, Opening State Courts to Class Actions. The Uniform Class Actions
Act, 32 Bus. LAW. 75, 85 (1976); State Class Actions, 27 S. CAROLINA L. REv. 87, 89
(1975); Comment, New Dimensions in Louisiana Class Actions, 36 LA. L. REV. 798, 800
(1976); Comment, Judicial Prerequisites to Class Actions in Illinois. Policy Practice, and the
Needfor Legislative Reform, 1976 U. ILL. LAW FORUM 1159, 1168; Comment, State Class
Action Statutes."A Comparative Analysis, 60 IOWA L. REV. 93, 119 (1974); Note, 8 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 496, 505 (1974); Note, 39 Mo. L. REv. 447, 453 (1974).
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The movement of class action litigation to state courts is demon-
strated in Williams v. Slate40 where the Louisiana Supreme Court con-
sidered for the first time the question whether the class action was
available in a mass tort situation. The court recognized that the first two
requirements for a class action, a numerous class making joinder imprac-
tical and an adequate class representative, were easily satisfied.41 The
"common right" requirement posed greater problems for the court, espe-
cially in light of possible variance in damages to individual class mem-
bers. In order to decide whether there was a right "common to all
members of the class," the court applied the federally-based criteria es-
tablished in Stevens42 to the facts presented and found that the class
action remedy was favored.43 The court listed several factors which it
deemed decisive in allowing the class action:
(1) Six hundred separate suits would unduly burden the courts
and risk inconsistent determinations;"
(2) The poverty of the prisoners and their individually small
claims threatened the loss of substantive rights if a class action
was not allowed;45
(3) Defendants' reasons for resisting liability were applicable to
the entire class; 46
(4) The common questions of law or fact predominated over any
questions affecting only individual members; 47
(5) The class action was the most appropriate procedural vehicle
to process the dispute fairly and efficiently because:
(a) There was no substantial interest adverse to allowing the
class action;
(b) The small number of suits already commenced did not
defeat the class action purpose;
(c) There was no difficulty in managing the litigation as a
class action.48
40: 350 So. 2d 131 (La. 1977).
41. Id at 133.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 134.
44. Id. at 135. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1); Stevens v. Bd. of Trustees of Police
Pension Fund, 309 So. 2d 144, 151 (La. 1975).
45. 350 So. 2d at 135.
46. Id. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2); Stevens v. Bd. of Trustees of Police Pension
Fund, 309 So. 2d 144, 151 (La. 1975).
47. 350 So. 2d at 135. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3); Stevens v. Bd. of Trustees of
Police Pension Fund, 309 So. 2d 144, 151 (La. 1975).
48. 350 So. 2d at 135.
1978] NOTES 1067
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW[
The possible variation in individual recoveries was held to be only
one factor that the court must consider in determining whether the class
action is the superior procedural method.4 9 The court noted that great
differences in individual damages would give rise to a desire for individ-
ual lawsuits and the likelihood of fragmentation of the class action into
multiple lawsuits.50  Under such circumstances, the manageability and
judicial efficiency criteria would not be satisfied and the lower court
would be correct in exercising its discretion not to allow the litigation to
proceed as a class action. 51
In extending the Louisiana class action to reach plaintiffs injured in
a mass tort, the Louisiana Supreme Court realized that possible due
process problems would arise.5 2 United States Supreme Court decisions
have established the due process requirement that notice must be given
to all identifiable prospective members of the class if they are to be
bound by the class action judgment.53  Unlike the federal rule,54 the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure makes no provision for notice to be
given to the unrepresented members of the class. Justice Tate, recogniz-
ing that article 191 of the Code gives a court all power necessary for the
exercise of its jurisdiction,55 declared that Louisiana courts are author-
ized to provide reasonable notice to identifiable members of the class.
56
While meeting the due process requirement, notice will also give the
members of the class the opportunity to "opt-out" of the class litigation
and thus to preserve their individual actions.57  The court refrained
49. Federal courts have generally held that differences among class members as to
damages is not enough to bar the class action remedy. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406
F.2d 291 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1968). See generally Miller, Problems in
Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions under Federal Rule 23 (b) (3), 54 F.R.D. 501,
504 (1972).
50. 350 So. 2d at 136.
51. Id
52. Id at 137.
53. See e.g., Schroeder v. City of N.Y., 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane v. Central Hano-
ver Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156 (1974) (court held that under federal rules notice must be given to identifiable
class members). See generally Maraist & Sharp, supra note 8.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2).
55. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 191: "A court possesses inherently all of the power necessary
for the exercise of its jurisdiction even though not granted expressly by law." See also LA.
CONST. art. V, § 2.
56. 350 So. 2d at 138.
57. Id. The "opt-out" device is an invention of amended Rule 23 whereby parties who
do not want to be bound by the class judgment may express this desire and "opt-out" of the
class. See, eg., WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 72 at 354; Pomerantz, New Developments in Class
Actions-Has Their Death KnellBeen Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAW 1259, 1266 (1970) ("The sole
1068 [Vol. 38
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from requiring written notice in every situation but held that under the
circumstances of this case, each member of the class was to receive writ-
ten notification.5" Justice Tate explained, however, that this notice need
not be given by formal service or even by mail, but may be delivered by
other "reliable informal means of communication." 59
The decision in the instant case convincingly proves that Louisiana
has embraced the full breadth of the federal class action rule.60 Even
23(b) (3) class actions, which resemble in character the old "spurious"
class actions, are now included in the wide scope of the state remedy. 6'
Plaintiffs who have before looked to the federal court as the forum to
bring their class action suits, may now turn to the state courts with more
likelihood of success.
Although the extent and availability of the Louisiana class action
has been established in the instant case, the problems in controlling the
litigation have not been discussed.62 The management problems will
involve two principal components: providing notice to the absent class
members, and calculating and distributing damages. 63
The court in Williams has judicially made notice a mandatory part
function of the required notice is to inform class members of their right to opt-out."); Note,
53 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 409 (1974).
58. 350 So. 2d at 138. See text at note 71, infra.
59. Id at 139. See generally Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58
F.R.D. 313 (1973); Comment, Management Problems of the Class Action under Rule 23(b)
(3), 6 U. SAN. F. L. REV. 343, 354 (1972). But see Becker, The Class Action Conflict. A
1976 Report, 75 F.R.D. 167, 170 (1977) (possibility that constitutional due process requires
notice to be given by first class mail where the absent class members' addresses are ascer-
tainable).
60. The Williams decision is the first time a majority of the supreme court adopted the
federal class action criteria since the Stevens decision was only a plurality opinion. See
note 23, supra. The class action in Williams would have had to qualify under rule 23(b)
(3) in order to have been allowed in federal court.
61. See Williams v. State, 350 So. 2d 131 (La. 1977). Under original Rule 23, a mass
tort class action would have been a spurious class action. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v.
United States, Ill F. Supp. 80, 90 (D.N.J. 1953); Williams v. State, 350 So. 2d 131, 140 (La.
1977) (Sanders, C.J., dissenting). It must be remembered that there are no spurious class
actions under the present Rule 23 but only "true" class actions. See WRIGHT, supra note 1,
§ 72 at 350 ("Nothing in the new rule corresponds to the former spurious class action, since
... the judgment in a class action under the new rule will bind all members of the class
.... "). See also Homburger, supra note 1, at 632; Kaplan, supra note 3, at 395 n.150.
62. To determine if a class action is manageable, the court weighs the costs to it in
terms of the expenditure of judicial resources against the benefits which would accrue to
the class members should their action prove successful. See Developments in the
Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1500 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].
63. See, e.g., Comment, The Cy Pres Solution to the Damage Distribution Problem of
1978] 1069
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of the Louisiana class action procedure.64 No mention is made, how-
ever, of who is to pay for the notice or of what method of giving notice is
to be followed in other cases. In Eisen v. Carlisle & facquein,65 the
United States Supreme Court established the rule that in Rule 23(b) (3)
class actions the class representative must pay for individual written no-
tice to all identifiable class members. 66 Since Eisen deals only with the
federal class action,67. the states are free to establish other guidelines con-
sistent with due process requirements.68 In Louisiana, a more flexible
rule should be established when the class claims are individually small.
In such a situation, requiring the class representative to give individual
written notice to each class member would have the effect of defeating
the class action. When the individual class claims are small, alternatives
to individual written notice should be devised. For example, the
Williams court said newspaper publication or public posting would be
appropriate in some instances.69 A workable rule for the state courts to
follow would be that established by the Uniform Class Actions Act 70
which requires individual written notice only if the individual's claim is
over one hundred dollars. If the claim is under one hundred dollars,
other reasonable notice methods could be used.7'
A related problem concerns the professional responsibility aspect of
the class action notice requirement. 72 When notice is to be given indi-
Mass Class Actions, 9 GA. L. REV. 893, 901 (1975); Comment, Manageability Under the
Proposed Uniform Class Action."An Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L. J. 1123, 1172 (1974).
64. 350 So. 2d at 138.
65. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
66. Id at 173, 177.
67. Id See, e.g., Scher, supra note 40, at 85; Note, 53 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 409
(1974).
68. See, e.g., Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376 (2d Dist.
1975). See also Comment, Manageability Under the Proposed Uniform Class Actions Act,
31 Sw.L.J. 715, 723 (1977); Note, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1222 (1976).
69. Williams v. State, 350 So. 2d 131, 138 (La. 1977). Other alternatives used in fed-
eral court have allowed the cost of notice to be divided between the class representative and
the defendant, see, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 438
F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971); Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); or allowed the
initial cost to be borne by the court, see, e.g., Illinois v. Harper & Row Publ. Inc., 301 F.
Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Note, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 943, 947 (1974).
70. U.C.A.A. § 7. See Scher, supra note 39, at 78; Unform Class Actions, 63 AM. B.
J. 837 (1977); Comment, supra note 68, at 731.
71. U.C.A.A. § 7(e). Other possible notice methods are newspapers, television, radio,
and public postings.
72. See, e.g., Simone, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D.
-375, 392 (1972) (author suggests that attorneys in class actions may unethically solicit their
clients); Comment, Ethical Obligations of the Attorney Under Rule 23-Abuses and
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vidually to the absent class members, court supervision must be exer-
cised to prevent the notice requirement from becoming a solicitation
device for the representative's attorney. At least one federal case has
cited solicitation by attorneys as justification for refusing to certify a
class action.73 Notice should be "neutral and objective in tone, and
should neither promote nor discourage the assertion of claims."'74 A
good practice would be for the attorneys to present to the court for its
approval the notice they intend to use.
7 5
Special problems also arise in damage computation and distribu-
tion.7 6 If the conventional judicial mechanisms are followed for the de-
termination of damages, an intolerable burden might be placed on the
courts. 7
7 It will be necessary for the courts to exercise discretion in se-
lecting innovative methods, tailored to the needs of particular cases, if
the class action device is not to be defeated for a lack of judicial effi-
ciency.
Calculation and distribution methods fall into four general catego-
ries. 78 First, the traditional method could be used which requires a full
evidentiary hearing with each class member having a separate day in
court. Although a precise computation of damages is possible under this
approach, the method would be time-consuming and confusing if a large
class is involved. Second, a summary judgment procedure could be em-
ployed whereby each absent member who furnished an affidavit could
recover a base amount, at least in the absence of contradictory evidence.
This is probably the best method to be used where all class members are
identified and the amount claimed by each is small. Since some proof of
damage is needed, the defendant does receive protection against totally
unjustified claims. A third method is to calculate damages on a class-
Reforms, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 224, 226 (1974). But see Moore, Does It Go Far
Enough?, 63 AM. B. J. 842, 843 (1977) (author argues that lawyers should be able to solicit
in class action situation).
73. Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 237 (N.D. Texas 1972).
74. Philadelphia Elect. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 462 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
75. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind.
1966); Comment, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.: Rule 23, The Class Action Device and its
Utilization, 22 FLA. L. REV. 631, 638-41 (1970).
76. See, e.g., State Class Actions, 27 S. CAROLINA L. REV. 87, 155 (1975); Comment,
Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculation in Consumer Class Actions, 70 MICH. L.
REV. 338, 360 (1971); Note, 4 Sw. U. L. REV. 112, 116 (1972).
77. See, e.g., Comment, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1615, 1637
(1972).
78. See Developments, supra note 62, at 1516.
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wide basis79 with a jury available at the defendant's option.80 Under
this method, the damages are based on the injury to the class as a whole
and not upon the individual injury to the class members. Use of this
approach should be reserved for a very large class when all members are
not identifiable. A quasi-administration system could be set up to dis-
tribute the damages.8 1 Finally, damages could be calculated on a class-
wide basis with any residue used for the benefit of the class. This is
called the "cy pres" method of recovery.8 2 Funds which cannot be de-
livered precisely to those class members with a legal claim are put to the
"next best" use to aid the class. This method can best be used when
members of a successful class action cannot be individually compensated
because of difficulties in identifying class members and in determining
the amounts of the individual claims.
The supreme court in Williams has expanded the Louisiana class
action remedy to include the full latitude of the federal action, including
the area of mass torts. By applying the legislative intent behind the class
action statute, Justice Tate has created a functional procedural rule
which is needed for efficient and fair judicial operation in a complex
society. A greater burden is placed upon the trial judge who will be
called upon to devise new methods of administration and application of
the judicial process.8 3 In many new areas, such as environmental law,
the Louisiana class action remedy should offer protection for the small
claimants who are injured and may find their only recovery in numbers.
Justice Tate in Stevens allowed the class action dragon to come out of
79. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 645, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 732 (1967). This
method of recovery has been called the fluid class recovery. See, e.g., Comment, supra
note 68, at 724; Comment, Management Problems of the Class Action Under Rule 23 (b) (3),
6 U. S. SAN. F. L. REV. 343, 363 (1972).
80. No constitutional problems should be raised with a classwide damage assessment if
the defendant is given an opportunity to adjudicate the damage claim before a jury. See
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 1784 at 122; Developments, supra note 62, at 1524.
81. Special masters or other judicially appointed officers could be in charge of the
administrative aspect of distributing the class recovery.
82. See, e.g., Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell
Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAW. 1259, 1260 (1970); Comment, The Cy Pres Solution to the
Damage Distribution Problem o/Mass Class Actions, 9 GA. L. REV. 893 (1975); Note, 39 U.
CHI. L. REV. 448, 452-53 (1972).
83. See Blecher, Is the Class Action Doing the Job?, 55 F.R.D. 365, 374 (1973). ("To
the judiciary must be committed the responsibility for balancing all of the competing inter-
ests: The innocent defendant should not be raped; the avaricious lawyer should not be
rewarded and the guilty defendant must not be permitted to profit.").
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his cave; in Williams he has tamed the dragon and made him a useful
animal.
Guy Holdridge
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION ARISING OUT OF PROCEDURE
FOR LEVYING SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS
Nine property owners petitioned to have their properties stricken
from an ordinance' assessing each lot for street improvements in propor-
tion to the frontage it bore to all of the abutting lots.2 The plaintiffs
contended that the ordinance resulted in excessive assessments against
their properties which caused them to pay a disproportionately larger
share of the cost of the improvements than other citizens of Baton Rouge
to whose general benefit these improvements accrued. After the trial
court denied relief, the First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed and or-
dered that the respective properties be deleted from the assessment ordi-
nance. 3 On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and held
that although the council received no evidence on the issue of propor-
tional benefit, the statement in the council's resolution and assessment
ordinance which recited that "each lot or parcel of real estate to be as-
sessed will be benefited to an amount not less than the proposed local or
special assessment" was a sufficient compliance with the statutory provi-
sions concerning the requisite benefits determination. The court further
concluded that one may not protest that a legislative body has not done
what a resolution and/or ordinance proclaims that it has done, and that
the council's determination of benefits was a legislative act that may not
be upset absent a manifest abuse of power exceeding limits of legislative
1. Local or Special Assessment Ordinance No. 4047 was adopted by the East Baton
Rouge Parish Council on June 27, 1973, assessing property adjacent to North Street in the
City of Baton Rouge for construction of improvements along North Street. This assess-
ment ordinance purported to assess the plaintiffs' property in accordance with LA. R.S.
33:3301-3319 (1950).
2. These properties are located adjacent to North Street in the City of Baton Rouge.
Before the improvements North Street was a two-lane asphalt street, bordered by side-
walks, street lights, and underground drainage. With the improvements it became a four-
lane concrete street bordered by wide sidwalks, underground conduits for street lighting,
improved drainage, and tree wells for plantings. Landry v. Parish of East Baton Rouge,
343 So. 2d 207, 210 (La. App. Ist Cir.), rev'd, 352 So. 2d 656 (La. 1977).
3. Landry v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 343 So. 2d 207 (La. App. Ist Cir.), rev'd,
352 So. 2d 656 (La. 1977).
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